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Regulating Cable Television*
By NICHOLAS P. MILLER**
ALAN BEALS***
The evolution of cable television from a community antenna tel-
evision (CATV) system carrying only broadcast signals to a high
capacity communications system carrying a wide variety of televi-
sion and nonvideo services raises significant policy and legal ques-
tions about the role of government regulation of cable. Congress
has recently considered legislation that would limit the ability of
local governments to regulate the local cable franchise.1 Such legis-
lation and the trend of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) to reduce federal regulation of electronic media underscore
the need for a clear definition of the appropriate regulatory role for
government. To determine the appropriate regulatory scheme for
cable, its proper treatment under the first amendment of the Con-
stitution must be resolved.
The National Cable Television Association (NCTA), the major
* This article is reprinted from 57 WASH. L. REV. 85 (1981). It appears as a response to
Goldberg, Ross, & Spector, Cable Television, Government Regulation, and the First
Amendment, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 577 (1981).
This article is based on a paper prepared for the National League of Cities Cable
Television Task Force, Mayor Charles Royer (Seattle), Chairman. The article was prepared
with the assistance of W. Randolph Young, of counsel, and Robert H. Ruxin, associate.
Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis & Holman; and of Cynthia Pols, legislative counsel, and Susan
McAdams, director, telecommunications project, National League of Cities. Their assistance
is gratefully acknowledge.
Mayor Royer presented testimony, based in part on this report, to the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce on September 24, 1981. The Subcommittee was holding hearings on diversity
in the media in preparation for drafting legislation.
** Partner, Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis & Holman, Washington, D.C.; B.A., University of
Washington, 1966; J.D., University of Washington, 1973.
*** Executive Director, National League of Cities; B.A., Colgate University, 1954; M.P.A.,
Syracuse University, 1955.
1. S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), as reported to the Senate floor would have pre-
vented local governments from regulating cable rates and from requiring cable operators to
lease channels to commercial users. The Senate, however, before passing the bill adopted an
amendment sponsored by Senator Goldwater to delete all provisions relating to local regula-
tion of cable from the bill. 127 CONG. REc. S11, 134-35 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1981).
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cable industry trade association, asserts in a report2 to Senator
Packwood that cable is analogous to newspapers. The NCTA ar-
gues that a cable operator should be considered a newspaper pub-
lisher under the First Amendment and, as such, entitled to First
Amendment protections accorded a newspaper publisher, such as
total editorial discretion, "without conditions and without require-
ments of access or balance." This article disputes this position
and argues that, due in part to cable's monopoly position, it is
more analogous to the broadcast medium than it is to the press.
Cable, however, in the final analysis is a unique communications
medium and should be treated as such for regulatory and First
Amendment purposes.
Background
A. The Evolving Nature of Cable
Cable television originated in mountainous or sparsely populated
areas where over-the-air television reception was poor or very lim-
ited. These older systems usually carried up to twelve channels of
over-the-air television broadcast signals received by well placed an-
tennas (often located on a nearby mountain) and by microwave re-
lay. In recent years cable has attracted significant attention in the
larger cities where high quality television signals are readily availa-
ble over the air.
This growth in interest in cable is the result of rapid technologi-
cal developments in the cable industry.' In the mid-seventies the
launching of domestic communications satellites (and the FCC's
authorizing their use for delivery of distant television signals)5
2. National Cable Television Association, The First Amendment: A New Interpretation
Needed for Cable, CABLEVISION, May 18, 1981, at 114 [hereinafter cited as NCTA Report]
(originally appeared as an unpublished report to Senator Packwood under the title Cable
Television, Government Regulation, and the First Amendment (Apr. 1981)).
3. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 156.
4. See NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT ON PROSPECTS FOR ADDITIONAL NETWORKS, APPENDIX: RECENT TRENDS IN CABLE
TELEVISION (January 1980) [hereinafter cited as FCC REPORT, CABLE APPENDIX]. See also
Hickey, The Great Land Rush is On, TV GUIDE, July 11, 1981, at 2.
5. In Southern Satellite Sys., 62 F.C.C.2d 153 (1976), the FCC granted initial authoriza-
tion to a common carrier to use satellite rather than terrestrial microwave facilities to de-
liver a distant television station signal to cable systems. In American Broadcasting Cos., 62
F.C.C.2d 901 (1976), the FCC authorized installation of 4.5 meter receive-only satellite earth
stations.
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made distributing a television signal nationwide economically via-
ble.' Satellites distribute nationally the signals of a few indepen-
dent broadcast stations (known as superstations) and other alter-
native television programming not available over the air to cable
systems from existing nearby broadcast stations. Initially, this al-
ternative programming was primarily movies. Now satellites de-
liver a wide variety of entertainment services created especially for
a cable audience.
During this same period, the transmission capacity of cable sys-
tems has expanded significantly. Most state-of-the-art cable sys-
tems can carry fifty-two and some even 100 or more simultaneous
television channels or other electronic information. This added
transmission capacity permits a cable system to carry multiple dis-
tant broadcast signals,8 the new entertainment programming avail-
able on satellites, and a wide variety of additional, nonentertain-
ment communications services.9
Cable technology will continue to evolve and offer even greater
service flexibility and transmission capacity. Within this decade,
optical fiber cable" will begin to replace traditional coaxial copper
6. A satellite normally offers the technical capacity to transmit a series of television sig-
nals simultaneously to every point in the continental United States equipped with a receive-
only earth station. The number of signals is determined by the number of transponders on
the satellite. To receive the signals, the earth stations must be tuned to that satellite tran-
sponders' transmission frequency and must also be pointed at that satellite. Ordinarily, a
single earth station antenna cannot receive the signals from more than one satellite at a
time.
7. At least 33 channels of television programming are currently available through satel-
lite-to-cable systems. Satellites are not technically limited to entertainment programming.
They can deliver any type of electronically formatted information.
8. The FCC has eliminated its restrictions on using distant broadcast signals.
9. State-of-the-art cable systems can-and many do-offer other services in addition to
broadcast and entertainment programming. Some examples of additional services now avail-
able are:
-television channels for public and government use;
-cable operator originated programming of local interest (origination cable-
casting);
-channels for educational use;
-closed circuit channels which connect local public institutions;
-specialty information channels devoted solely to financial, consumer price, or
weather information;
-all news channels;
-FM radio channels;
-children's, cultural, Spanish language, video music, or other channels devoted to
special appeal audiences.
10. Optical fiber cables contain one or more optical fibers through which laser light, mod-
ulated to carry information, is transmitted.
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cable. Fiber optic systems will have the capacity to carry hundreds
of television (or equivalent) channels. This decade also should see
development of meaningful two-way interactive services." By 1990
a predicted twenty-eight million homes will be wired for two-way
service.12 Cable technology will offer the possibility of whole new
classes of potential services. 8 Which of these new services are ac-
tually offered'over cable will depend on the marketplace."'
B. Structure of Current Regulation
.As interstate communications, cable is regulated by the FCC
under the Communications Act of 1934.18 In 1968 the Supreme
Court held that FCC regulation of cable is justified as "reasonably
11. An interactive cable service involves transmitting information electronically in one
direction followed by a response in the opposite direction. For example, meter reading may
develop as an economically viable interactive cable service. The cable operator would trans-
mit a signal to a device attached to a subscriber's meter asking for a reading. The device
would then transmit the current reading in response.
Cable service development has concentrated to date on mass audience, one-way services.
The typical cable system operates like a series of television stations. The operator picks
entertainment programming packages which will appeal to the widest number of potential
cable system subscribers. Few cable operators offer services which elicit any subscriber re-
sponse other than paying their bill. The cable industry is beginning to experiment with mass
appeal services that elicit a consumer response. Advertising is one example, since most cable
channels have been free of commercials. Pay-per-view equipment and nonentertainment
services such as electronic check writing and shop-by-cable are other examples of more di-
rect audience involvement.
12. See CABLEVISION, June 1, 1981, at 158.
13. A few of the technical possibilities are:
-security monitoring (burglar, fire and police alarms);
-remote computer terminals providing access to a vast array of computer pro-
grams and data bases;
-medical monitoring;
-meter reading;
-energy management;
-transactional services, e.g., home shopping and banking;
-polling;
-new highway traffic management;
-accessing selected libraries of films or video tapes;
-text retrieval;
-electronic mail delivery.
Futurists envision a "wired city" in which all homes are connected to a cable system
which provides all video services. See Young, The Wired City, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, May
25, 1981, at 28.
14. Some cable services, although technically feasible, may not enjoy a wide consumer
demand. Electronic mail, for example, may remain too costly to compete with delivered
mail.
15. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The FCC has authority to regulate
cable systems whenever they transmit broadcast signals or other signals across state lines
(e.g., by satellite).
[Vol. 3610
REGULATING CABLE TELEVISION
ancillary" to its authority to regulate broadcasting." The FCC has
extended broadcasting's fairness doctrine17 and equal time require-
ments18 to cable." The.FCC also required cable operators to dedi-
cate some channels for public, governmental, educational, and
leased access. The Supreme Court, however, held in FCC v. Mid-
west Video Corp.2" that these access requirements were outside of
the FCC's authority because they were not "reasonably ancillary"
to regulating broadcasting.
Since the FCC no longer regulates many aspects of cable, state
and local regulation has the greatest effect on cable operators, and
is the regulation that they would most like to avoid." Some states
regulate cable directly but most rely on local government to per-
form all nonfederal regulation. Typically a local government enacts
a franchise ordinance22 establishing the basic framework for the
community's regulation and addressing local aspects of cable oper-
16. United States v. Southwest Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
17. The fairness doctrine "requires broadcasters to devote time to issues of public impor-
tance and to present contrasting point of view." NCTA Report, supra note 2, at .118.
18. The equal time requirement requires that if one political candidate uses a broadcast-
ing station, that station must give other candidates for the same office an "equal opportu-
nity to use the station." Id.
19. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, .209 (1980). Other FCC rules for cable include:
-television broadcast signals that a cable system must carry, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-
.63 (1980);
-maximum franchise fees local governments may charge, 47 C.F.R. § 76.31
(1980);
-nonduplication of certain television signals, 47 C.F.R. § 76.92 (1980);
-other rules analagous to broadcasting rules (personal attack, lotteries, obscen-
ity). 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.209-.215 (1980);
-equal employment opportunity rules, 47 C.F.R. § 76.311 (1980);
-cross-ownership proscriptions on certain television broadcast and telephone
company interests. 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.55, 76.501 (1980);
-technical operation standards for cable systems, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.601-.617 (1980);
-sports blackout rules, 47 C.F.R. § 76.67 (1980).
The FCC also recommends some local franchising procedures and provisions. These in-
clude a maximum 15-year franchise period, prompt construction, consumer protection pro-
visions, and a public franchising process affording due process. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1980).
20. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The Court did not reach the question whether FCC regulation of
cable violated cable operators' First Amendment rights, but noted that the issue was "not
frivolous." Id. at 709 n.19.
21. See note I and accompanying text, supra.
22. In a few communities the cable system is actually owned and operated by the local
government or its instrumentality. There are at least 28 municipally-owned cable systems.
MacKenna, The Cabling of America: What about Municipal Ownership?, 70 NATIONAL
CIVIL REV. 307, 310 (1981). San Bruno, California is the largest municipality operating a
cable system. MacKenna advises municipalities to consider cable ownership as a source of
revenue. He suggests, however, that small municipalities may be more successful cable sys-
tem owners than large cities..Id. at 330.
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ation.2 3 Local governments usually require cable operators to set
aside some channels for local use-local access programming-and
for commercial leasing to cable programmers-leased access-as
well as for other uses similar to those the FCC required before
Midwest Video.24
The issues being debated between the cable industry and the
municipalities are threefold. First, given the increasing variety of
services cable is offering to subscribers and to the community,
which functions performed by cable raise issues of First Amend-
ment rights? Are these individual functions analogous to newspa-
pers, to broadcasting, or to something else? Second, do the cable
operators' First Amendment rights preclude federal, state, and lo-
cal regulation of content, as in the fairness doctrine, and of struc-
ture, as in access requirements? Do the First Amendment rights of
other speakers and of the viewer support or require some govern-
ment intervention? And third, are First Amendment rights of
cable operators diminished or waived by their voluntary contrac-
tual agreements to provide services, such as local access, when they
bid on and win a local cable franchise?
II.
The First Amendment and Cable
Cable operators decide what information is transmitted over
cable systems, which programmers and service providers may use
the system, and what uses of the system may occur without the
operator's consent. Only federal, state, and local regulations limit
the operator's absolute control and insure rights of access to the
system for users other than the operator."
Government has two primary objectives in regulating cable: to
23. Franchise ordinances vary from community to community but most include:
-use of public right-of-way;
-maximum subscriber rates;
-franchise fees (normally three to five percent of the cable system's gross
revenue);
-service areas;
-minimum number of channels;
-minimum signal carriage requirements;
-access channel requirements.
24. See NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 150 (Code of Good Cable Television Franchising
Conduct urges cities to assure "local public, community, educational, municipal, and leased
cable access").
25. See notes 15-24 and accompanying text, supra.
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protect the public interest and to facilitate the rapid development
of an increasing variety of valuable public communication services.
Developing an appropriate regulatory framework to meet these
objectives depends to a large degree on the status of cable under
the First Amendment. Cable's First Amendment status cannot be
defined until legislatures and courts develop answers to complex
policy questions. What are the First Amendment rights of cable
operators, subscribers, and the public? What First Amendment
values can regulating cable enhance positively or frustrate
inappropriately?
Two guiding principles underlie First Amendment standards.
First, the First Amendment preserves a free press in order to pro-
vide people with a robust and wide-ranging debate on public is-
sues. The Constitution does not preserve a free press for the eco-
nomic or psychological gratification of publishers and editors.
Under the Constitution the rights of the reader, listener, and
viewer are paramount, and.the print and broadcast media must act
in ways not always consistent with the media's economic interest
when those interests conflict with the audience's interests."
Second, the First Amendment affects each communication me-
dium in a unique way. The Supreme Court has developed distinct
First Amendment standards for each communication medium that
take into account the unique characteristics of each medium. As
Justice Jackson stated in.Kovacs v. Cooper: "The moving picture
screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and
the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and
dangers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself. . . ." In the same
case, Justice Frankfurter criticized the use of loose analogies and
broad First Amendment theories:
Some of the arguments made in this case strikingly illustrate how
easy it is to fall into the ways of mechanical jurisprudence
through the use of oversimplified formulas. It is argued that the
Constitution protects freedom of speech: Freedom of speech
means the right to communicate, whatever the physical means for
so doing; sound trucks are one form of communication: ergo this
26. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). But see Baldasty &
Simpson, The Deceptive 'Right to Know': How Pessimism Rewrote the First Amendment,
56 WASH. L. REV. 365 (1981).
27. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 736, 748 (1978); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969).
28. 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (concurring opinion).
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form is entitled to the same protection as any other means of
communication, whether by tongue or pen. Such sterile argumen-
tation treats society as though it consisted of bloodless categories.
The various forms of modern so-called "mass communications"
raise issues that were not implied in the means of communication
known or contemplated by Franklin and Jefferson and
Madison. . . . Movies have created problems not presented by
the circulation of books, pamphlets, or newspapers. . . . Broad-
casting in turn has produced its brood of complicated problems
hardly to be solved by an easy formula about the preferred posi-
tion of free speech."'
Cable may now be added to Justice Frankfurter's list of media
deserving finely tuned First Amendment standards rather than
"oversimplified formulas."
A. The Functions of Cable
To understand how the First Amendment should affect the regu-
lation of cable television, it is necessary to analyze cable's charac-
teristics. This section will review cable's functional characteristics
and compare them to the characteristics of other media.30 Subse-
quent sections will discuss the significance of these characteristics
and distinctions in determining the proper First Amendment ap-
proach to cable.
1. Local Television Broadcast and Access
Programming
One function a cable operator performs is to retransmit local tel-
evision broadcast signals without changing the format or content of
the broadcasts. FCC rules require this function." The cable opera-
tor also transmits local access programming" without exercising
any control over the programming. Franchise agreements with lo-
cal governments often require this function. The operator's role is
usually limited to plugging video tapes into playback recorders ac-
cording to a prearranged schedule. The lack of editorial control in
29. Id. at 96 (concurring opinion) (citations omitted).
30. For purposes of analysis, NCTA's characterization of a newspaper operation as com-
pared to a cable operation will be used: "The [cable] operator, like a newspaper editor, must
exercise editorial judgment and control, deciding what is shown and what is not, and what
editorial policies are appropriate." NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 114.
31. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-.63 (1980).
32. Local access programming includes programming provided by individuals or groups in
the community, educational institutions, and governmental entities.
[Vol. 3614
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carrying out this function distinguishes the operator from a news-
paper publisher. Instead, the operator's position is similar to that
of a common carrier in that the operator has no control over the
information transmitted, does not select it, and cannot discrimi-
nate among users eligible for access under the mandatory signal
carriage and local access requirements.
2. Pay and Distant Signal Television
Programming
Another category of service provided by cable systems is carry-
ing distant television signals. Satellites currently transmit the sig-
nals of three television superstations to cable systems nationally
and relay other signals regionally. Cable operators select these sig-
nals and retransmit them. Formerly, these distant signals were re-
layed to the cable headend" by a microwave system. Satellite
transmission services have opened a new class of nonbroadcast
programming developed specifically for cable systems. Some of
these programs are provided to cable operators free of charge, and
at least one service pays operators to carry its signals."' Other pro-
grams, known as pay television or pay cable, are sold to operators
on a per cable subscriber basis.
The cable system operator exercises no content control over
these distant television signals. 8 The cable operator's role is lim-
ited to selecting the signal and assigning it a channel. Agreements
to retransmit the distant signals typically prohibit the cable opera-
33. The cable headend is the cable system facility used to control and insert signals into
the distribution cable. It typically includes an antenna for receiving over-the-air signals,
microwave or satellite earth reception facilities, or both, and necessary system controls.
34. Services that are offered free to cable systems include religious broadcasting network
signals and some services supported entirely by advertising. The ESPN network will com-
pensate operators for carrying its signal. See ESPN to Compensate Operators, CABLEVISION,
Aug. 3, 1981, at 14.
35. FCC rules require under certain circumstances that distant broadcast signals not si-
multaneously duplicate a local signal. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92-.161 (1980). Therefore, certain
portions of the distant signal may have to be excised by the cable operator. Local spot
announcements may also be inserted by the operator. FCC rules treat imported nonbroad-
cast signals as cablecasting and subject them to the same broadcast type regulation as origi-
nation cablecasting under 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205-.221 (1980). However, the FCC apparently did
not anticipate applying such regulations to distant signals at the time it promulgated the
rules; nor do the rules appear to serve any useful purpose due to the predominately en-
tertainment nature of the programming and the practical lack of control by the local cable
operator. See Cable Television Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, Cable Televi-
sion and the Political Broadcasting Laws: The 1980 Election Experience and Proposals for
Change (Jan. 1981)(unpublished report to Senator Goldwater).
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tor from deleting or changing any portion of the programming pro-
vided.3 6 In contrast, newspaper publishers usually retain editorial
control over the content of stories written by wire services, syndi-
cated columnists, and even comic strips. As with local retransmis-
sion, distant signal carriage bears little relationship to the opera-
tion of a newspaper.
3. Informational Services
Other cable system channels provide textual information, such
as time, weather, stock prices, grocery and other consumer price
information, and news wire reports. A few advanced cable systems
are experimenting with a new textual service which enables sub-
scribers to access a large information library. These new informa-
tional channels bear a superficial resemblance to an electronic
newspaper because they present text that reads like newspaper
stories.. Nevertheless, the functions of a cable operator in present-
ing this information and the functions of a newspaper publisher
are not alike.
The publisher of a newspaper has editorial control over the
newspaper's contents, aside from stock market reports and other
similar information which represent a very small percentage of
space in most newspapers. In comparison, the cable operator has
almost no editorial control over the content of the information
channels. The cable operator merely selects the category of infor-
mation or service offered. The operator's role is limited to deciding
which information source or service will be used. The operator
does not control the content of even the new text services which
are designed, assembled, edited, and maintained by service compa-
nies for direct sale to cable subscribers. The cable operator is
merely a passive transmitter of this information.
If cable systems were to transmit the actual text of a newspaper,
then the subscriber would receive an electronic newspaper. But the
newspaper editors, not the cable operator, would still control the
newspaper's content. The operator's role would be limited to de-
ciding which newspaper(s) would have.access to the system's sub-
scribers and would not include control of the content of the text of
36. A few cable operators, especially those with very limited channel capacity, try to
"cherry pick" or select programs from several nonpremium services. Programmers, espe-
cially those supported by advertising, discourage this practice if they cannot prohibit it con-
tractually. See, e.g., ESPN to Compensate Operators, CABLEVISION, Aug. 3, 1981, at 14.
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the transmitted newspapers. The cable operator's first amendment
status would be similar to that of a newsstand operator: the opera-
tor could choose what newspapers to transmit just as a newsstand
operator can determine what newspapers to sell. Neither has con-
trol over the content of those they select.
Cable operators would take on the attributes of newspaper pub-
lishers only if they were to compose and edit their own electronic
newspaper. Even then, such attributes would apply to the cable
operators only for the newspaper channel, not the entire cable
operation.
4. Origination Cablecasting
The cable operator has control over programming on channels
that are not used for carrying local television broadcasting signals
and local access programming. As discussed, the operator may se-
lect other packaged services for those channels. On some channels,
however, the operator may have exclusive control over the pro-
gramming. If the operator produces origination cablecast"7 pro-
gramming, the operator can assemble original news, entertainment,
and other local programming, including editorials. In this origina-
tion cablecasting function the operator behaves like a local broad-
caster and must comply with the fairness doctrine, personal attack,
and equal time requirements and is subject to limitations on lot-
teries, obscenity, and sponsorship identification. The origination
cablecaster has the same copyright interests in this programming
as broadcasters have in their programs. The only real difference
between origination cablecasting and broadcasting is how the pro-
gramming is transmitted-the broadcaster uses the limited radio
frequency spectrum while the cable operator uses the closed access
coaxial cable. The origination cablecaster is not more like a news-
paper than is a local television broadcaster.
B. Assessing Cable's Unique First Amendment Sta-
tus: Policy Aspects
Several major public policy issues establish the framework for
assessing cable's first amendment status. These include cable's mo-
37. Cablecasting is defined by the FCC rules as programming exclusive of broadcast sig-
nals. Origination cablecasting is defined as programming subject to the exclusive control of
the cable operator, 47 C.F.R. § 76.5 (1980).
38. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205-.221 (1980).
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nopoly position in each community, concentration of cable system
ownership, access rights for programmers and service providers
other than the operator, content regulation, and cable's use of the
public right-of-way.
Examining these issues is necessary because first amendment
standards and obligations are not applied in a vacuum, but rather
exist in the context of practical considerations.* The limits on an
individual's first amendment rights are generally those necessary
to protect the rights of other individuals or important public con-
cerns.4 0 For example, a person's free speech right does not entitle
that person to publish obscene material or make libelous state-
ments."' Each of the public policy issues most relevant to cable is
explained briefly in turn.
1. Cable's Monopoly Position
Although a cable operator rarely holds an exclusive franchise,
competition between two systems in the same area is practically
nonexistent. In only about six of more than 6,000 cable systems in
the United States does one operator compete with another opera-
tor for the same subscribers.42 Once a system is built, a second op-
erator normally will not build a separate system to serve the same
subscribers because of the economics of cable. Typically, forty to
forty-five percent of the homes passed by a cable system subscribe.
Since this is only about ten percent more than the penetration rate
usually considered the breakeven point for operating a system
profitably," two systems can rarely survive in the same geographic
area. Furthermore, financing a second system will be difficult be-
cause the operator of the existing system may be well enough es-
tablished to reduce rates. Since the initial construction costs of a
cable system are high, requiring heavy capital investment and
39. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-88 (1949).
40. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
41. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973).
42. See Brief for Appellant at 10, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
No. 80-1882 (10th Cir. Dec. 24, 1980). See also Mini Cable Systems in Dallas: Small Fish in
a Big Pond, CABLEVISION, Aug. 3,1981, at 23; New York May Experiment with Overbuilding
in Borroughs, CABLEVISION, July 29, 1981, at 12; Dawson, How Safe is Cable's "Natural
Monopoly'?, CABLEVIsION, June 1, 1981 at 333, 340; FCC REPORT, CABLE APPENDIX, supra
note 4, at 11.
43. See Cable Economic Inquiry, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 686 (1980) (discussion of system
breakeven penetration rates and demand for basic cable television service).
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financing costs, this will force the second operator either to charge
rates that are below these costs or to go out of business.
The cable operators' monopoly is based on their control over the
conduit into each home and business. Like the local telephone
company, cable is a conduit for transmitting services into homes
and businesses. But the two-way services offered by new technol-
ogy will make it a conduit for transmitting communications from
homes and businesses as well. Although a consumer may obtain
many of the cable services from other sources, no other technology
offers the bundle of communications services provided by cable."
The cable system usually carries or duplicates every other televi-
sion service available in the community at the time the cable sys-
tem was built. Unless the cable operator consents, however, new
over-the-air television services such as low power television and
subscription television will not be transmitted on the cable
system."
Local governments typically protect their citizens from cable's
monopoly power by regulating rates for basic subscriber services,
insuring access for users on a nondiscriminatory basis, and setting
minimum service standards.
2. Concentration of Control
The first amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest
44. Video programming received through other media, e.g., free broadcast television, sub-
scription television, multipoint distribution service, and direct broadcast satellites, cannot
easily complete with a cable television system for viewers within homes that subscribe to the
cable system. A television set, once attached to a cable system, usually cannot be tuned to
receive a service that is not carried on the cable system unless a special switch is installed.
Moreover, these other media cannot offer the variety and number of channels received
through cable. Nor do these other media have a significant potential for two-way user inter-
action. As a recent report on competition among media services in the Dallas market noted:
While three STV [subscription television] operations and one MDS [multipoint
distribution] service are waging a frantic battle for the Dallas TV viewer, their
strides are considered to be only temporary. Because of the high rates and limited
services STV and MDS offer, Warner [the franchise owner] does not expect these
services to hinder substantially the success it will have with the 80-channel system
it plans to build and is scheduled to launch in four years.
Mini Cable Systems in Dallas: Small Fish in a Big Pond, CABLEVISION, Aug. 3, 1981, at 23.
The local telephone system can provide some two-way services, but it is not likely to
match the cost effective potential of cable for two-way transmission of data between
thousands of outlying terminals and a central point.
45. The FCC does not require cable systems to carry subscription television stations, 47
C.F.R. § 76.64 (1980). The FCC's proposed rules for low power television would not apply
cable "must carry" rules to that service. Low Power Television Broadcasting, 82 F.C.C.2d
47, 60 n.31 (1980).
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possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonis-
tic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."" Congress and
the FCC have implemented this constitutional principle by encour-
aging competition and preventing concentration of control in the
media. For example, the Newspaper Preservation Act of 197047 fa-
cilitates continued editorial competition between newspapers even
though one of the newspapers in a community is facing economic
failure. The FCC will not grant an entity more than one license for
television broadcast service in a market, limits an entity to seven
television licenses nationwide, and limits the cross-ownership of a
television or radio station and a daily newspaper in the same com-
munity.48 The FCC also proscribes cross-ownership between a
cable operator and a broadcast television station (or national net-
work) or telephone company in the same community."
Cable has the potential to make widely available a diversity of
communications. The emerging ownership structure of the cable
industry, however, may prevent realization of that potential. Many
of the same factors that led to the present federal policy of limiting
ownership concentration in other media are evident in the owner-
ship structure of cable. Each cable operator, subject only to its par-
ticular franchise requirements, has control over who uses the sys-
tem's channels and what services and programming are provided
over the system. 0 This potential control of a wide range of elec-
tronic communications in a community contrasts with a broad-
caster's limited control of one electronic voice. The broadcaster
controls only the single frequency channel assigned under an FCC
license. As cable subscribers increase and the number of homes
and businesses with alternative electronic communications access
decreases, the ownership concentration issues will assume even
greater significance.
46. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1976). Under that Act, if the Attorney General consents, then
a failing newspaper may enter into a joint operating arrangement with a competitive paper
in the same community without incurring antitrust liability. See Barnette, Some Failing
Newspapers Find Uncle Sam a Pal, WASHINGTON POST, July 24, 1981, at All, col. 1.
48. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, .240, .636 (1980).
49. 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.55, 76.501 (1980). The FCC occasionally waives the telephone-cable
cross-ownership prohibition in rural areas. See Telephone Co.-CATV Cross-ownership
Rules, 84 F.C.C.2d 335 (1980) (notice of proposed rulemaking). It recently granted a waiver
of the network-cable ownership proscription to permit CBS to own cable systems serving no
more than 90,000 subscribers or 0.5% of the nation's cable television subscribers, whichever
is less. TELEVISION DIGEST, Aug. 10, 1981, at 4.
50. The cable operator will not always choose to control the information on every channel
but will presumably select the signal or user for each channel.
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Another ownership concentration problem is caused by the grow-
ing acquisition of cable systems by large operators who own many
systems. In 1970, the largest twenty-five cable system operators
served only 46.7% of all cable system subscribers in the United
States." By 1980 the figure was 68% .52 Federal law does not place
any limit on multiple system ownership.53 This concentration prob-
lem is exacerbated by the increase in vertical integration of the
multiple system operators, as they develop an extensive capacity to
produce programs.5" This vertical integration gives them additional
power over the content of programs, the prices paid by cable oper-
ators for the programs," and access of competing programmers to
their systems.56 Additionally, ownership of cable by other media is
a growing phenomenon.57 The FCC does not limit this cross-media
51. CABLE TELEVISION INFORMATION CENTER, CABLE DATA 6 (1972).
52. Calculated from statistics in TELEVISION DIGEST, CABLE AND STATION COVERAGE ATLAS
4a, 12a (1980-81).
53. See, e.g., Cablecom Gen., Inc., No. 81-265 (F.C.C. June 11, 1981)(Commissioner Wash-
burn, concurring).
54. In 1979, four pay cable programmer/packagers producing programs for approximately
85% of the pay cable subscribers in the U.S. were owned by or affiliated with cable opera-
tors serving approxiiately 20% of the nation's cable subscribers. No system owned by a pay
programmer had an affiliation with any programmer other than its corporate relative. FCC
REPORT, CABLE APPENDIX, supra note 4, at 35-36. See also note 57 infra.
55. Unlike an independent program producer, a producer related to a cable operator is
assured of a market for its programming in affiliated cable systems. Thus, a cable related
producer has greater flexibility in pricing its products for use by nonaffiliated cable systems.
56. FCC Commissioner James R. Fogarty recently expressed concern over the trend to-
ward vertical integration in cable systems. FCC NEWS, July 31, 1981, at 1 (separate state-
ment of Commissioner Fogarty on FCC approval of transfer of control of Teleprompter Cor-
poration to Westinghouse Broadcasting Company). He said that vertical integration of cable
systems held the potential for anti-competitive conduct if vertically integrated cable opera-
tors did not provide full and open access to their systems. For example:
[A] vertically integrated cable operator may refuse to distribute programming
from other companies in order to preclude competition with services offered by its
own affiliated program supplier. For example, HBO might be dropped to promote
Showtime, or CNN might be dropped to promote a new Group W news service,
thereby eliminating competition at the local level. If this should in fact occur, the
subscribers to these cable systems would be denied a measure of program choice
and program suppliers would be denied the ability to compete directly for the
patronage of those subscribers.
Id. The Commissioner conceded that vertical integration is a fact of life in the cable system.
Nevertheless, he noted that a 1974 Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications had con-
cluded that a policy preventing system operators from owning the programs they distribute
would best serve the public interest. Id.
57. In 1979 some 78.6% of all cable systems were owned by corporations with other media
interests. This figure represents a 3.1% increase in such cross-media ownership over 1978.
The following cross-media ownership -patterns were reported in 1979: broadcasters-32.8%;
program producers and distributors-17.5%; newspapers-13.1%; book or magazine pub-
lishers-11.1%; and theatre-4.0%. TELEVISION DIGEST, CABLE AND STATION COVERAGE AT-
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ownership except where it proscribes cable ownership by broadcast
television stations in the same market.
The monopoly position of cable operators in the geographic area
served by the system, their control over a single distribution sys-
tem with multichannel capacity, and the growth in horizontal and
vertical integration and in cross-media ownership raise significant
public policy questions. It is a risky proposition to rely on poten-
tial competition to deter abuses by national conglomerates in the
cable industry. During a similar period of governmental neglect be-
tween 1907 and 1921, Theodore Vail assimilated a number of mo-
nopolistic local telecommunications companies into the largest,
most monopolistic corporation in the United States today: Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Company." Thoughtful analysis of the
appropriate relationship between evolving communications media
and the government is a prerequisite today for developing policy
on concentration of control.
3. Use of the Public Right-of-Way
A cable operator, like the telephone and electric power compa-
nies, must string the system's cable on utility poles or use under-
ground cables or ducts. These pole-line or underground facilities
are usually located in a public right-of-way or street, or traverse
private property under public utility easements. The public has a
substantial interest in requiring that the construction, mainte-
nance, and use of utility poles and the digging up of city streets or
private land under easement rights meet aesthetic, safety, and con-
venience standards. Local governments typically require a cable
operator to get a permit for such public utility-type privileges. 9
Even if a cable system were not a natural monopoly, the limited
availability of space for pole attachments and underground ducts
in many communities would preclude the existence of more than
LAS 12a (1980-81). See also Baker, Broadcast Groups Turning Collision Course with Cable
Into High Road to Profitability, CABLEVISION, Mar. 23, 1981, at 40-47.
58. See J. BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS (1976).
59. Private individuals have no inherent right to conduct private business along public
rights-of-way. The right of state or local governments to require permits for encroachment
and to assign conditions to such use has been universally upheld. Moreover, such permits
are revocable at any time, and no right to use the street for private purposes can be ac-
quired except by prescription from the municipality. 10 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 30.48-.52 (3d ed. 1981). See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 397, 315
(1967) ("We have consistently recognized the strong interest of state and local governments
in regulating the use of their streets and other public places.").
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one cable system. 0 When several service providers wish to offer
services to the public but physical limitations permit only one to
offer services, the local government is obligated to impose condi-
tions on the permit that will insure that the community receives
the services most nearly equivalent to those which would have
been offered had there been no physical limit on competition."
4. Access Rights
Because of cable's monopoly position, access to the cable system
for parties other than the cable operator needs to be insured in
order to maintain distribution of a wide range of communications
services on a competitive basis with minimal entry barriers to new
service providers. Cable operators, free of regulatory constraints,
are likely to maximize profits by using their monopoly and monop-
sony powers. On the basis of their monopoly position, cable opera-
tors can set the prices charged to subscribers for services largely
free of all market constraints and limited only by the consumers'
elasticity of demand. As monopsonists, operators are able to con-
trol the prices charged to users for access to the cable system. By
using the pricing mechanism in a discriminatory fashion to exclude
competitive services from the system, operators have the power to
determine which service providers and programmers can have ac-
cess to the cable system.
A logical limit on the operator's power is to require the operator
to allow reasonable access to the pipeline for others to distribute
competing services, whether entertainment or public affairs pro-
gramming, data distribution or two-way interactive services. Gov-
ernment currently imposes two general access requirements on
cable systems to insure access for some competitive services. The
FCC requires that cable systems must carry the unaltered signals
of local television broadcast stations,6 2 and many franchise agree-
60. Utility poles and underground duct space represent major construction expenses. Ex-
isting utility poles frequently have little if any additional space besides electric and tele-
phone cables. For example, the FCC assumes a typical 35-foot utility pole to have 17 feet of
usable space which, considering electrical interference, placement, and safety space require-
ments for three cables (one telephone, one electric, and one cable television), is insufficient
to accommodate a fourth cable without substantial rearrangement or replacement. See Pole
Attachments, 72 F.C.C.2d 59, 71 (1979).
61. See F. WELCH, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 76-78 (1968), for a discussion of the conve-
nience and necessity certification requirements of state and federal law. See generally NEW
YORK STATE COMMISSION ON CABLE TELEVISION, CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISING WORKBOOK
chs. 4, 5 (1980).
62. See note 31, supra.
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ments require cable operators to provide channels for community,
educational, governmental, and commercial leased access on a non-
discriminatory basis.6 3 These access requirements are predicated
on the assumption that persons other than the cable operator
should have some rights to use the cable system.
5. Content Regulation
In regulating programming content, the FCC recognizes the need
for cable programming that serves the interests of the community.
The FCC imposes content regulation on cablecast programming
similar to that applied to broadcasters. This regulation includes
the fairness doctrine, personal attack, and election candidate equal
time rules." If local governments have the authority to guarantee
access to channels- for individuals and groups, then perhaps no
broadcast-type content regulation of cable may be necessary. This
concept is discussed below."
C. The Cable Operator's First Amendment Status
as Determined by Function
Cable performs many functions, and the cable operator's control
of the content of the communications differs from function to
function. Because cable's First Amendment status differs for each
of these functions, the First Amendment rights of the cable opera-
tor, cable program supplier, and cable viewer should be analyzed
separately for each function. An analysis by function avoids
overgeneralization and provides the flexibility to address new func-
tions that may develop without having to reevaluate the cable sys-
tem as a whole.
There are three basic categories of operator control relevant for
First Amendment purposes: no control over content, selection con-
trol over content, and exclusive control over content. The no-con-
trol category includes mandatory broadcast signals that the opera-
tor must carry, such as local television, local access programming,
and leased access programming. Selection control includes pro-
gramming and services selected by the operator but over which the
63. The FCC has deleted its minimum access requirements which were struck down as
beyond the Commission's authority under the Communicatins Act in FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). Cable TV Access Channel Rules, 83 F.C.C.2d 197 (1981).
64. See note 38, supra. See also note 31, supra (FCC rules require carrying most local TV
signals).
65. See notes 99-124 and accompanying text, infra.
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operator exercises no content control once the selection is made.
Examples of selection control are distant television signals and in-
formation and textual services. The exclusive control category en-
compasses local origination cablecasting. The cable operator's First
Amendment rights vary according to the category of content
control.
1. No-Control Category
Within the no-control category, the cable operator engages in
none of the communicative, self-expressive activity which the First
Amendment protects." The operator exercises no control or edito-
rial discretion over the information, but merely provides a channel
to transmit programming or information created, controlled, and
selected by others. The First Amendment protects the underlying
speaker, for example the local broadcast station or the citizen pro-
ducing a public access program. The no-control category involves
no First Amendment rights for the cable operator, however, be-
cause the cable operator is not speaking in the First Amendment
sense.67
2. Selection Control Category
Cable operators argue that their selection of a television signal or
66. Although the Supreme Court has not defined precisely the speech protected by the
First Amendment, protected expression generally involves communication of thoughts,
ideas, or emotion. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 495, 515 (1939). Moreover, protected
speech does not encompass all words or conduct intended to express an idea. United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942).
67. The First Amendment prevents the government from requiring involuntary speech in
certain circumstances. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state may not constitu-
tionally require individual to disseminate ideological message on license plate); West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (state cannot compel flag salute).
The Supreme Court distinguished Wooley and Barnette, however, and held that a state can
require a private shopping center owner to allow individuals to petition on the private prop-
erty. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). The Court rejected the
shopping center owner's argument that he had a First Amendment right not be forced to
use his property as a forum for others for three reasons. First, the views of the speakers were
unlikely to be identified as those of the owner. Second, the state does not dictate the mes-
sage to be displayed. And third, the property owner could expressly disavow any connection
with the message by posting signs disclaiming sponsorship. Id. at 87.
This reasoning applies to cable access requirements imposed by local governments. Cable
operators are not required to carry a state-dictated ideological message and cable operators
can present their own views on other channels and disclaim sponsorship of views on local or
leased access channels. See text accompanying notes 69, 85-88, 99-105, infra.
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other information for carriage on their systems is protected by the
First Amendment. But the First Amendment comes into play in
this selection control category only in limited instances and prima-
rily protects the rights of the viewers, not the rights of the cable
operator per se. The appropriate comparison is not to a newspaper
publisher, but a broadcaster whose license is conditioned on serv-
ing the public interest.** Addressing the First Amendment rights of
broadcasters in relation to those of the public, the Supreme Court
recently stated:
Although the broadcastifg industry is entitled under the First
Amendment to exercise "the widest journalistic freedom consis-
tent with its public [duties],". . . the Court has made clear that:
"It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately, prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market. . . . It is the right of the public
to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetical, moral, and
other ideas and experiences which is crucial here."O9
In the cable context, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia quoted Professor Meiklejohn, "'the point of ultimate in-
terest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hear-
ers,' '7o and further noted. that "the right of free speech . . . does
not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others.' "71 If
cable -operators do have a right under the First Amendment to se-
lect programs, this right must be balanced against the First
Amendment. rights of the viewers.
Less weight should be given to the operator's rights in the selec-
tion control category because the cable operator's selection of a
particular signal does not add significantly to the message trans-
mitted.7 1 Indeed, the cable operdt6r's purpose in choosing pro-
68. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The
FCC is empowered to issue regulations and grant licenses based on public interest, conve-
nience, and necessity. Id. §§ 303, 309. Similarly, a municipality authorizes a private entity
(e.g., a cable system oi a utility) to use public rights-of-way to promote the general public
interest and provide service to the public.
69. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2829 (1981) (quoting Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973), and Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis by court).
70. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977) (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1960)).
71. Id. at 46 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969)).
72. See id. at 49.
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gramming (for example in selecting Home Box Office rather than
Showtime) is not to participate in public discussion or to express
ideas, activities which the First Amendment is primarily designed
to protect.7 3 Rather, the operator is merely exercising a business
judgment as to which product will sell best.74 To the extent that
this judgment involves speech, that speech is related primarily to
the operator's economic interests and therefore receives only lim-
ited First Amendment protection.7 5
Even assuming that the cable operator is "speaking" for First
Amendment purposes when the operator selects programs for the
system, this speech act does not supersede the First Amendment
rights of the cable system subscribers. Many cable franchise agree-
ments specify television signals that the cable system must carry,
and FCC rules require carrying local television signals.76 Such re-
quirements generally reflect the community's desire for diverse
programming and for continuing existing television services.7 7 Op-
erators may contract away their right to select programming, either
in a franchise agreement with the local government or in a distri-
bution contract with a program service provider. The local govern-
ment, in negotiating a franchise, has the right to insure the widest
possible selection of available programs on the de facto monopoly
cable system.7 8 If the cable operator is committed to providing spe-
cific programming in the franchise agreement, the contractual
rights of the subscribers to receive that programming, as reflected
73. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
74. On the surface such a choice appears similar to a broadcaster's decision to affiliate
with (and carry the programs of) network A as opposed to network B. However, broadcast-
ers are ultimately responsible for the content of the programming they broadcast, whether
network originated or not. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
204-06 (1943). Broadcasters routinely review network programming in advance and substi-
tute other programming. In contrast, cable operators exercise no such control over the sig-
nals they import (except as noted in notes 35 & 36, supra).
75. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-63
(1980); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977). If the cable
operator voluntarily agrees to limit selection discretion as part of the commercial transac-
tion of obtaining a franchise, the operator's first amendment arguments are weakened fur-
ther. See notes 133-145 and accompanying text, infra.
76. See note 31, supra ("must carry" rules).
77. "Must carry" rules were developed to insure that cable would increase the broadcast
service available to a community by supplementing rather than replacing existing signals.
Second Report and Order in Docket 14895, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 736 (1966).
78. Local governments often ask for specific signals or categories of signals in their re-
quest for proposals. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON CABLE TELEVISION, CABLE
TELEVISION FRANCHISING WORKBOOK 70 (1980).
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in the negotiated agreement, will prevail over any rights of the
cable operator."
3. Exclusive Control Category
When a cable operator originates cablecast programming, the
operator controls the content of programming transmitted on that
particular channel. This function raises complex first amendment
questions. The two relevant First Amendment models are broad-
casting and the print media. These models present the issue of
what the government can require from certain classes of speakers.
The government's power to require speech, rather than to pro-
scribe it,s0 is implicit in rules imposed by the FCC such as the fair-
ness doctrine, personal attack, and equal time. A comparison of
these models and an analysis of why they differ will be instructive
for determining the appropriate model for cable.
(a.) Comparing the Newspaper Model and the
Broadcast Model
The Supreme Court has zealously guarded the print media's
First Amendment rights, but has not allowed the media to use
their First Amendment rights to restrain others' First Amendment
rights. In Associated Press v. United States," the Court held that
the First Aamendment did not exempt the media from antitrust
laws. The Court stated that the First Amendment "rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public. . . . Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not
for some."" This suggested that a right of access to newspapers
might exist. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,"3 how-
ever, the Court ruled that a Florida Statute giving a person at-
tacked in a publication a right of reply violated the First Amend-
ment. In Tornillo, the Court reasoned that requiring the additional
printing cost, the composing time, and the use of scarce column
79. See text accompanying notes 133-145, infra (discussion of the effect of negotiating the
franchise agreement on the cable operator's first amendment rights).
80. This analysis does not address government censorship because no such government
right has been seriously claimed for broadcasting or newspapers nor is it claimed for cable-
casting. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976) specifically proscribes any FCC censorship or interference
with the right of free speech by radio communications.
81. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
82. Id. at 20.
83. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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space would restrain publishing. It stated that publishers should
not be compelled "to publish that which "'reason tells them
should not be published.' ""'
The Court has not extended such broad First Amendment rights
to broadcasters. The Court has upheld rules that require broad-
casters to provide time for airing opposing points of view or for
responding to personal attack. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 5 the Court stated:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the
Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with
others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obliga-
tions to present those views and voices which are representative
of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from the airwaves."
The Court went on to state: "[Tjhe First Amendment confers no
right on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on 'their'
frequencies and no right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce
resource which the Government has denied others the right to
use.' "87
Unfortunately, neither the Red Lion nor the Tornillo opinions
analyze and compare their different treatment of the print media
and the broadcast media under the first amendment. In Red Lion,
the Court focused on the first amendment rights of the listening or
viewing audience and the physical limitations of the radio spec-
trum. The Red Lion Court quoted Associated Press: "'Freedom of
the press from governmental interference under the First Amend-
ment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private
interests.' "
In Tornillo, the Court was not concerned by the lack of access to
a limited medium. This was in spite of strong evidence that con-
centrated ownership of the press had virtually eliminated competi-
tion. Many cities have only one local newspaper but most commu-
nities are served by several television and radio stations. Yet the
Tornillo Court, unlike the Red Lion Court, did not give any weight
to the reader's right to know or the speaker's right to access when
press outlets are limited.
84. Id. at 256.
85. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
86. Id. at 389.
87. Id. at 391.
88. Id. at 392 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
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To understand the Supreme Court's disparate treatment of first
amendment rights in these cases, the circumstances of each case
must be analyzed. In Tornillo, although the opportunity for new
newspapers was limited, the limited availability of newspaper out-
lets was the result of natural economic forces, rather than of gov-
ernmental restrictions. 9 In broadcasting, however, the limited
competition is the result of governmental restrictions on the num-
ber of outlets due to radio spectrum limitations. Any person has
the right to publish printed material without any significant gov-
ernment restriction although competition and other economic fac-
tors (for example, the large initial investment required) may limit
the number of economically viable publications in a given area or
on a particular subject. Because these limitations are the result of
the marketplace rather than government action, government inter-
vention to protect readers' rights is not justified. In contrast, the
limited number of broadcast outlets is the result of governmentally
imposed limits and generally is not the result of marketplace
forces.90
An additional distinction between the print and the broadcast
media is that the print media do not use a public resource as a
transmission medium. Since broadcasters use a valuable public re-
source-the radio spectrum-they must behave as trustees: "It
does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given the
privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire
community, obligated to give suitable time and attention to mat-
ters of great public concern."9' Another possible reason for the dis-
parate treatment of the two media under the First Amendment is
the reverence given to the press in the United States as the basic
89. Many communities can economically support only one daily newspaper. However, a
wide variety of other publications circulate: national newspapers, regional newspapers,
weekly newspapers, national news and specialty magazines, and trade publications, to name
a few. See, e.g., Lippman, Journal Papers Will Go Daily in September, WASHINGTON POST,
Aug. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
90. The D.C. Circuit has recognized this distinction between Red Lion and Tornillo. The
court said: "[S]carcity which is the result solely of economic conditions is apparently insuffi-
cient to justify even limited government intrusion into the First Amendment rights of the
conventional press. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. . . ." Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). In a dictum, the
court in Home Box Office refused to apply to cable the first amendment analysis developed
in Red Lion for broadcasting because "an essential precondition of that theory-physical
interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government-is absent." Id. at 44-
45. Nevertheless, the court suggested that the Tornillo analysis for newspapers may also not
be appropriate. IId. at 46 n.82.
91. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 394.
[Vol. 3630
REGULATING CABLE TELEVISION
vehicle for "diverse and antagonistic voices." Twentieth century
technologies, such as broadcasting and cable, offer the courts and
Congress an opportunity to reevaluate how to attain the goals of
the First Amendment without altering the special status of news-
papers under the Constitution.
In summary, the primary reason for treating the two media dif-
ferently is the degree of government and public involvement in
each. In the print media, where the degree of competition and the
number of outlets is the result of natural market forces and those
outlets can operate without a special governmentally conferred
benefit, the Court generally has not allowed regulation of the out-
let's content. In broadcasting, where the degree of competition and
number of outlets is the direct result of government control and
those outlets can only operate by using a public resource, the
Court has permitted some limited control of content.
(b.) The Cable Model
The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on how the First
Amendment applies to cable.9 2 The Court has held, however, that
cable is engaged in interstate communications by wire or radio and
that the FCC has authority to regulate cable as "reasonably ancil-
lary" to its regulation of broadcast television under the Communi-
cations Act of 1934." The FCC has imposed restraints upon cable
similar to those the Court refused to apply to newspapers in
Tornillo. The FCC determines which broadcast signals a cable sys-
tem must carry and applies virtually the same fairness, equal time,
and personal attack' regulations to cablecasting as govern
broadcasting."
In addition to the historical links between broadcasting and
cable, the Red Lion and Tornillo analyses suggest that cable
should be accorded treatment for exclusively controlled program-
ming similar to that of broadcasting rather than that of newspa-
pers under the First Amendment. Unlike newspapers, cable de-
pends on government for its existence. Federal rules and statutes
establish specific market opportunities and advantages for cable.'5
92. See note 20 and accompanying text, supra.
93. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
94. See note 19, supra, for a list of the regulations applied by the FCC to cable.
95. For example, in 1978 Congress added a new section to the Communications Act of
1934 by the Communications Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, § 6, 92 Stat. 35
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (Supp. III 1979)), to regulate cable attachments to utility poles
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At the local level, cable would not exist without a grant of author-
ity to use the public right-of-way. In most cases, as a result of a
combination of technological factors, physical availability of pole
space, the need to use the public right-of-way, and the economics
of the market, only one cable system can exist.96 Local government
has the authority to select the operator of that system on the basis
of the community's needs through a franchise agreement.
Government regulation of the cable monopoly is lawful at the
federal level under the Communications Act of 1934 and at the
state or local level under public police powers. 7 Government may
regulate to protect the public interest (for example, to insure ade-
quate service or reasonable access to the system or to prevent mo-
nopoly profits) or to allocate a limited public resource (such as pole
and underground space). Thus, the conceptual basis for First
Amendment standards for cablecasting is similar to that for broad-
casting. A broadcaster can speak only if the government grants the
broadcaster a license to use the radio spectrum. Similarly, a cable
operator can speak only if the government grants the operator a
license to use the limited public right-of-way.98 For First Amend-
ment purposes, cable should be treated like broadcasting when the
cable operator is performing those functions, such as origination
programming, that are similar to broadcasting.
III.
The First Amendment and Access
Affirmative government action to facilitate expression has
emerged in the last forty years as one of the most significant First
Amendment issues.99 The Supreme Court's statement in Red Lion,
reemphasized in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,1oo
in part "to minimize the effect of unjust or unreasonable pole attachment practices on the
wider development of cable television service to the public." S. REP. No. 95-580, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 109, 122.
96. See note 60, supra; text accompanying notes 42 & 43, supra.
97. See notes 509, supra; notes 20-23 and accompanying text, supra.
98. In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981), the Court stated:
"A licensed broadcaster is 'granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part
of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public
obligations.'" Id. at 2829 (quoting United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003
(D.C. Cir. 1966)). Such language fits the circumstances of a cable operator as easily as a
broadcaster.
99. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 559 (1941); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 693 (1978).
100. 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2829 (1981) (emphasis omitted).
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that "it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount," is as relevant for cable as it
was for broadcasting. This section develops the argument that the
right of access to cable systems is essential for cable to achieve its
full potential as a medium for free expression. Cable access differs
from access to other media and reasonable cable access require-
ments are consistent with fundamental principles of free
expression.
A. Justification for Access
The principle that a multiplicity of outlets permits robust ex-
pression 01 argues for a multiplicity of voices free from operator
control on the single cable system in a community. In FCC v.
WNCN Listeners Guild,0 2 the FCC determined that the radio
marketplace has enough licensees to -provide diverse expression
and entertainment without specific government regulation of pro-
gramming formats. Each radio station in a community is owned,
operated, and controlled by a licensee unaffiliated with any other
radio station in that community. In contrast, each community with
a cable system has only one licensee, who operates the only en-
trance to the cable marketplace. Having designated the gatekeeper,
the government-whether federal, state, or local-must assume re-
sponsibility for insuring that the gatekeeper serves the commu-
nity's interests by opening that gate on a nondiscriminatory basis
to a variety of speakers. Then the community should not signifi-
cantly control what those speakers say once they enter. 0
Moreover, the local cable company has ample opportunity to ex-
press opinions, present information, and select entertainment. For
example, on a thirty-six channel cable system with six channels re-
served for access and ten "must carry" broadcast station signals,
the operator has 480 channel hours per day to program as ihe op-
erator sees fit. In Columbia Broadcasting System, the Supreme
Court held that reasonable statutory broadcast access rights for
political candidates do not impair the discretion of broadcasters.
101. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20. (1945).
102. 101 S. Ct. 1266 (1981), NCTA cites this case to support the proposition that the best
guarantee of diversity and freedom of information is to eliminate government regulation in
the communications marketplace. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 118-19.
103. There are some limited exceptions to the proscription of governmment control of
speech. Regulation of obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973), and pro-
hibition of broadcasting lottery information. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976), are two examples.
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Similarly, reasonable access requirements do not impair the discre-
tion of cable operators "to present their views on any issue or to
carry any particular type of programming."to0
Columbia Broadcasting System reaffirms the validity of govern-
ment regulation that balances the First Amendment rights of vari-
ous interests. Cable access requirements imposed by a local gov-
ernment as a condition for the grant of a monopoly franchise and
structured like the access statute at issue in Columbia Broadcast-
ing System create limited but reasonable rights to access, not a
general right of access to any channel at any time. In so doing,
these requirements balance the first amendment rights of the view-
ers with the economic interest and first amendment rights of the
cable operator.105
General communications policies, as well as the First Amend-
ment, justify cable access.106 Cable can provide competition and di-
versity in communications services. Cable channels used for the
one-way or two-way transmission of data or voices will perform a
valuable local communications service now largely monopolized by
the local telephone company. While a cable system is not likely to
be a substitute for the local telephone network, it can perform cer-
tain local two-way communications more efficiently than the tele-
phone system, such as communications between a central location
and multiple terminals.1 0 7
104. COLUMBIA BROADCASTING Sys., 101 S. Ct. at 2830. Cable operators also argue that
they need absolute control over all of a cable system's channels for financial reasons. This
need has not been established. In fact, the skyrocketing value of cable systems and the fierce
competition for franchises, even in cities with extensive access requirements, suggest
strongly that total control of all channels is not necessary for financial viability. See text
accompanying note 132, infra.
105. Implementing the principle of access can be left to the states and their instrumental-
ities. Allowing states or local governments to establish access requirements comports with
the tenth amendment concept of federalism. "The essence of federalism is that states must
be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common,
uniform mold." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979).
.106. The justification for access extends beyond First Amendment considerations to pub-
lic policies such as those embodied in the antitrust statutes. For example, leased access
requirements can prevent a cable operator from monopolizing interactive services such as
security systems, banking, or data base access. See Channel 100, Toledo, Inc. v. Comcast
Cablevision Corp., No. 80-40071 (E.D. Mich. May 5, 1980) (order granting preliminary in-
junction), where a preliminary injunction was issued preventing the cable system from evict-
ing a channel lessee. See also Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentration, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 221 (1970).
107. For example, Manhattan Cable Television plans to transmit data between the mu-
nicipal building and nine New York City municipal computer service centers using its coax-
ial cable rather than leased telephone lines. See CABLEVISION, July 20, 1981, at 12. Also, local
634 [Vol. 3
REGULATING CABLE TELEVISION
If competition and diversity in communications services are de-
sirable, this alternative local communications medium should be
available for the widest possible public use. But the cable operator,
left to his or her own discretion, will have little incentive to lease
two-way channels to potential competitors on nondiscriminatory
terms and conditions. For example, a cable operator with a
financial interest in a security service provided over its cable sys-
tem may be unwilling to lease channel capacity to a local burglar
alarm company or may charge a discriminatory rate. A cable sys-
tem's leased channel service need not be subjected to common car-
rier-type regulation to achieve equitable results. A reasonable, non-
discriminatory rate and service access requirement applicable to all
types of services would insure that the local cable system is used
for the benefit of all citizens and is available to growing and di-
verse communications services.
B. Lack of Danger in Access Requirements
The National Cable Television Association argues that cable ac-
cess requirements are dangerous for the media.10 It lists a series of
dangers which apply, if at all, to newspapers and broadcasting and
then fails to show how cable may be subject to these dangers. It is
inappropriate to presume that potential dangers associated with
print and broadcast access automatically apply to cable system ac-
cess. One commentator who has explicitly assessed the potential
harms and benefits of cable access regulation has concluded that
the competing values of minimizing government intervention and
insuring equal opportunity for expression can be reconciled
through regulating cable access.109
A review of NCTA's list of "potential dangers" will clarify the
debate. The first danger, as described by Professor Tribe, discuss-
ing access requirements in the media, is "'deterring those items of
coverage that will trigger duties of affording access at the media's
expense."110 This is not relevant to cable access requirements be-
cause requiring leased and local cable access is not contingent on a
cable channels will be used in connection with a switched digital data network being devel-
oped by Tymnet, Inc. and Satellite Business Systems for communications between New
York City and San Francisco.
108. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 147.
109. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Reg-
ulation of the Mass Media, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1976).
110. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 147 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 697 (1978)).
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trigger event. Access requirements do not depend on how a cable
company uses other channels or on the content of programs on
those channels. For example, cable access does not require that a
cable company carrying one news service provide channels to all
other news services. Instead, it requires merely that the company
make channels available for others to use as they wish. Cable ac-
cess, unlike newspaper or broadcast access, does not encourage
cable operators to self-censor or to "conclude that the safe course
is to avoid controversy.""'
The second suggested danger is "'inviting manipulation of me-
dia by whichever bureaucrats are entrusted to assure access.' ""
The government's role, however, in insuring nondiscriminatory ac-
cess to the community's cable system resembles its role in adopting
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations for other forms of
expression."' In these other roles, the danger of government
"manipulating the media" is not outweighed by the value in rea-
sonable regulation. When a citizen uses a public resource for an
expressive purpose, the government may insure that the citizen
does so in an orderly fashion, with minimal intrusion on the First
Amendment rights of other citizens.' 14 The benefits from access, in
facilitating rational and fair opportunities to communicate through
cable, far outweigh any potential abuse. A government access chan-
nel, for example, promotes the important goals of conducting gov-
ernment in the open" 5 and of "enhancing the ability of . . . the
public to receive information necessary for the effective operation
of the democratic process.""
The manipulative bureaucrat has not emerged in cable access re-
quirements. No case of actual abuse or of any significant problem
111. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
112. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 147 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONNSTITUTIONAL
LAW 697 (1978)).
113. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) ("[Tlhe government may adopt reasona-
ble time, place, and manner regulations, which do not discriminate among speakers or ideas,
in order to further an important governmental interest unrelated to the restriction of com-
munication"); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
114. Compare Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)(anti-handbill ordinance was invalid
as applied to labor, religious, and political pamphleteering despite the state's legitimate pur-
pose of minimizing litter, noise, and traffic congestion and protecting people from fraud and
invasion of privacy) with Reynolds v. Tennessee, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974)(the Court refused to
review a conviction, under a statute prohibiting disturbance of religious assemblies, for
chanting during the President's speech at a religious gathering).
115. Cf., e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976); Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)(federal open government laws).
116. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 101 S. Ct. at 2830.
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associated with access regulations has arisen anywhere in the coun-
try. Moreover, most cities have established access plans that are
free of any administrative discretion. Such plans commonly pro-
vide nondiscriminatory guidelines to qualify for access, insulate su-
pervision of access channels from government influence (except
government access channels), 1  and establish separate noncompet-
ing categories for access."' A cable system operator's discretion in
providing additional access through its own channels is unaffected.
NCTA suggests a third danger," 'escalating from access regula-
tion to much more dubious exercises of government control.' "119
This allegation is irrelevant to access regulations, which are based
on structure rather than on content.o20 Requiring access does not
give the government the opportunity to interfere with program se-
lection and program content on access channels.' 2 1
Significant access opportunities-community, educational, gov-
ernmental, and commercially leased-and increased cable coverage
and penetration should decrease rather than increase the need for
federal cablecasting rules such as equal time, fairness, and right of
reply. Developing alternative opportunities for electronic expres-
sion may even eliminate the need for such rules (or "regulatory
impediments" as NCTA characterizes them).' Until those alter-
natives exist, however, "impediments" must be distinguished from
access opportunities. NCTA cites practical considerations such as
burdensome recordkeeping requirements and intrusive government
enforcement as reasons for avoiding content regulation. Access ar-
rangements have none of these problems. If, as NCTA suggests, a
117. See note 121, infra.
118. For example, an access agreement will have different access requirements for com-
munity, educational, leased government, and two-way access.
119. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 147 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 697 (1978)).
120. The FCC has sanctioned this concept of structural rather than content based regula-
tion of cable television. It recently reaffirmed its policy of not applying the fairness doctrine
and equal opportunities for political candidates rules to access programming, "as long as the
channels on which such programming is presented themselves have inherent in their func-
tioning, access of a type which makes possible equal opportunities for political candidates
and time for the provision of programming covering all sides of controversial issues of public
importance." Cable TV Access Channel Rules, 83 F.C.C.2d 147, 148 (1980).
121. If an access channel is dedicated to government use, the government may exclude
others from using that channel and control the content. This limited direct government use
of cable is consistent with the First Amendment, which allows the government to "add its
own voice to the many that it must tolerate, provided it does not drown out private commu-
nication." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITIONAL LAw 590 (1978).
122. NCTA Repport, supra note 2, at 150.
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cable system with 100 channels has 2,400 hours of program trans-
mission per day,"' reserving some of these channels for access is a
reasonable and minimally burdensome means of protecting citi-
zens' First Amendment rights.12 4 If Congress and the Supreme
Court affirm government's authority to guarantee the availability
of adequate access channels on all cable systems, then perhaps
content regulations, such as the fairness doctrine and equal time,
may be eliminated or made less burdensome.
C. Voluntary Contractual Obligations and the First
Amendment
Most local governments continue to require access channels in
the franchise agreement."' Although cable operators voluntarily
commit themselves to providing access in these franchise agree-
ments, the NCTA criticizes such. access requirements as unconsti-
tutionally conditioning enjoyment of a state granted privilege on
relinquishing First Amendment rights.126 This argument, however,
ignores the many cases that uphold state regulation even when it
curtails the exercise of constitutional rights. 1 7
This article has argued that access provisions in a franchise
agreement do not violate the First Amendment rights of cable op-
erators." Although requiring the operator to reserve some chan-
nels for public access may possibly affect the operator's profit po-
tential, that is not sufficient to justify prohibiting municipal
regulation of a business activity in which the public has a substan-
123. Id.
124. Access requirements may even benefit the cable company. NCTA notes the valuable
marketing role access plays. NCTA Report (original unpublished version to Senator
Packwood), supra note 2, at 31 n.95. See note 131 and accompanying text, infra.
125. The FCC's access requirements were held to be void in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,
440 U.S. 689 (1979). See text accompanying note 20, supra.
126. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 156 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972)).
127. See notes 135-145 and accompanying text, infra.
128. The First Amendment prohibits governmentally sanctioned distinctions based on the
content of speech. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976). Access provisions in a
franchise agreement, however, are content neutral. See text accompanying notes 110-124,
supra. A local government does not tell the cable operator what messages to carry on the
access channels. The cable operator is simply required to make channels available to those
who want to convey a message. Cases such as Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), in which the government abridged individual free-
dom of expression by imposing sanctions based solely on the content of constitutionally
protected speech, do not apply to content neutral requirements. See also FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 773, 799-800 (1978).
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tial interest."'
Local governments typically require access channels in the
franchise agreements by stating these and other requirements in a
request for proposals and including these obligations in the final
franchise agreement. As of March, 1981, according to NCTA, more
than 1,018 access channels were operating. The cable industry rec-
ognizes the utility of free public access channels "as a marketing
technique to gain consumer acceptance and expand market pene-
tration."o30 Cable companies continue to bid for franchises, promis-
ing substantial commitments to access and frequently offering
more access channels than required.'3 ' Even in Boston, where pro-
posed access requirements are among the most demanding, two
cable companies conducted a fierce battle for the franchise. 3  .
To the extent that access requirements involve First Amend-
ment rights of the cable operator, the parties to a cable franchise
agreement-freely entered into by each party for mutual bene-
fit-may limit the operator's First Amendment rights in return for
the benefits of the franchise. A fundamental principle of contract
law allows competent parties to contract to perform or abstain
from a course of conduct and to manage their affairs in their own
way unless grounds for judicial interference are very clear.' A
cable company has no opportunity to exercise any First Amend-
ment rights in a community until it is awarded a cable franchise.
The franchise gives the cable company the ability and the right to
129. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 49 n.97 (D.C. Cir.), cert: denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977). Cf. California State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 111
(1951) (fact that insurance regulation, which requires insurance companies to insure certain
high risk persons, may diminish company profits does not render regulation an unconstitu-
tional taking of property). Cable operators' deducation of some channels solely to nonex-
pressive purposes, such as business data transmission, security monitoring, and banking,
challenges NCTA's arguments that the cable operator's freedom of expression will be uncon-
stitutionally limited if the operator is faced with any regulation which intrudes on the oper-
ator's content discretion. NCTA's real concern appears to be that access requirements might
interfere with a cable operator's ability to allow access only to the most lucrative lease
customers.
130. NCTA Report (original unpublished version to Senator Packwood), supra note 2, at
31 n.95.
131. For example, Cox Cable recently agreed to provide $450,000 annually for public ac-
cess in New Orleans and more when the company increases rates. New Orleans and Cox
Sign Franchise Pact, MULTICHANNEL NEws, July 27, 1981, at 11.
132. Competition for Boston Franchise Grows Fierce and Furious, CABLEVISION, July 6,
1981, at 12.
133. Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205-06 (1928); Doctor Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park and Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911)(Holmes, J., dissenting); 6A A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 1376 n.16 (1962).
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express itself without government interference. In exchange for
this right, the cable operator may voluntarily and constitutionally
agree to allocate some channels for access in consideration for the
franchise so that the First Amendment rights of others will be
enhanced. 134
Agreements which limit the constitutional rights of one or both
parties are often valid. For example, a prospective employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency must sign a contract which requires
that the employee submit any proposed publication for prior re-
view."' Other cases have upheld agreements waiving various con-
stitutional rights, including certain procedural due process
rights,'" eleventh amendment sovereign immunity,1 17 the right to
be present at a trial,"' the right to a jury trial," and the right to
be free from warrantless searches.4 0 Similarly, a cable operator's
agreement to dedicate a portion of the community's cable system
for public access is lawful. The franchising authority is simply con-
tracting to protect substantial community and public interests' 4'
by requiring access channels as one term of the franchise
contract." 2
134. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 101 S. Ct. at 2829, quoted in note 98, supra; Illi-
nois Broadcasting Co. v. City of Decatur, 96 Ill. App. 2d 254, 238 N.E.2d 261 (1968).
135. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). The Supreme Court sanctioned this
provision and noted: "Moreover, this Court's cases make clear that-even in the absence of
an express agreement-the CIA could have acted to protect substantial government inter-
ests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might
be protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 509 n.3.
136. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
137. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
138. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
139. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
140. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
141. See part II B, supra.
142. The cable industry cites Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), for the pro-
position that the state "may not impose conditions [on the grant of a privilege] which will
require the relinquishment of constitutional rights." NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 156.
The validity of Frost in light of the undoubted constitutionality of the Communications Act
of 1934, which conditions the grant of a broadcast license on a number of public interest
requirements, including access requirements that limit a broadcaster's First Amendment
rights, is questionable. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775
(1978), which upheld FCC rules preventing those acquiring a broadcast license from owning
a newspaper in the same community. See generally Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184,
193 n.11 (1964)(distinguished Frost on the ground that the condition sought to be imposed
there was outside the scope of the municipality's regulatory power); Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 82 n.3 (1955)(Frankfurter, J., concurring)(suggesting
Frost may have little survival value); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328
F.2d 165, 173 (9th Cir. 1964)(plaintiff was required to accept a power license "upon such
terms as Congress has determined should be imposed in the public interest").
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Even without an express agreement, a party's acceptance of a
public benefit, such as a franchise agreement, may operate as an
implied waiver of constitutional rights, particularly if infringing on
those rights is necessary to protect the public interest served by
granting the benefit. Restrictions on political activity that would
otherwise be protected by the First Amendment may be imposed
on federal employees,"4 as may restrictions on the rights of mili-
tary personnel to petition the government.""' It is well settled that
a statute imposing a minimal burden on First Amendment rights
will be upheld if it furthers an important purpose within the
state's regulatory powers.14 5 Mandating reasonable access to a lim-
ited number of cable system channels is not intruding on the cable
operator's own freedom of speech and upholds an important public
interest in furthering the ability of others to speak. Access require-
ments are a reasonable means of insuring that a community's cable
system will operate in the public interest with minimal government
regulation.
IV.
Conclusion
Cable provides an increasing variety of communications services;
it is much more than just "cable television." Cable today carries
broadcast television signals, nonbroadcast television signals, and
local cablecast and access programming. It also offers informa-
tional services, data .services, and two-way communications which
will increase substantially as information retrieval and interactive
systems are fully developed.
For First Amendment purposes, cable is a unique communica-
tions medium, fulfilling several significant, different communica-
tions functions simultaneously. The First Amendment requires
evaluating cable on a function-by-function basis according to the
nature of the communication and the degree of control over con-
tent exercised by the cable operator. Functionally, some channels
are much like common carrier services, where the cable operator
has no control over content. On other channels the cable operator
merely selects the general type of information or programming to
be transmitted but does not control the content. The third func-
143. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973).
144. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
145. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971).
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tional category includes channels that are similar to broadcasting
where the cable operator has exclusive control.
The cable system operator has no First Amendment rights in the
no-control channels. The other two channel categories raise ques-
tions about the First Amendment rights of the subscriber and the
community as well as rights of the cable operator. A community
served by a single high-capacity distribution cable system can pro-
tect its citizens' First Amendment rights without unduly hamper-
ing those of the cable operator. The cable operator may transmit
whatever programming and information the operator believes ap-
propriate, subject only to carrying those broadcast signals the fed-
eral government believes necessary to protect over-the-air broad-
casting and carrying any additional signals the local government
believes necessary to protect the First Amendment rights of the
community's citizens. Other potential cable system users must also
have reasonable access to this conduit to insure that it distributes
a multiplicity of voices, ideas, and information. Indeed, while the
cable operator enjoys an economic monopoly in operating the con-
duit, the operator has no monopoly rights that the First Amend-
ment protects. Government regulatory requirements, which need
not be complex or burdensome, are necessary to balance the com-
munity's interests in reasonable diversity and public access against
the potential dangers associated with monopoly control of the sys-
tem by the operator.
The cable industry suggests that cable is an electronic newspa-
per entitled to the same protection under the First Amendment as
the printed press. Such a unitary classification of cable is not only
self-serving but illogical. The cable operator does not perform the
same editorial-role as a newspaper editor. The cable operator may
exert full editorial control over some channels of the system but
even in this role the operator is more like a broadcaster than a
newspaper editor.
Unlike a newspaper, the cable operator distributes a valuable
and limited public resource through a pipeline that uses the public
right-of-way. Cable is a natural monopoly, in some respects like a
utility. Substitutes for various services provided over a given chan-
nel of the system may exist in the community, but there is only
one cable pipeline, with vast capacity and service diversity poten-
tial, and consequent economic advantage. A government franchise
effectively gives a system operator a de facto monopoly. This alone
justifies different First Amendment treatment from the print me-
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dia which experiences intense marketplace competition.
Cable performs important functions similar to broadcasting. Yet
cable need not be regulated like broadcasting, with each cablecast
channel subjected to broadcast-like content regulation. A regulated
system of reasonable access which gives expression to multiple
community views could eliminate the need for broadcast-type reg-
ulation of cable.
Cable is a unique communications medium. It and its multiple
functions in a community should be so treated under the first
amendment. Sweeping constitutional generalities oversimplify
cable's problems, denigrate the First Amendment rights of others
in communities it serves, and ignore all the government experience
with cable at the federal, state and local levels.

